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1. At 8:pproximately' l.330 on 25 November, Misty 41, Holden/Konopka, heard ( 1 · , ~jc V 
Gram.et 01 calling for his wing man - 02 - on guard. We had just returned }' 
from the tanker and were south west of delta lS. We immediately switched 
to guard and called GrOlllJlet 01. Crown 6 also came up on guard at this time. 
01 stated that he thought he had lost his wing man. Cro'Wn 6 asked his 
position and 01 passed it in La.t/IDng. We asked if he was close to delta 
29J Grommet 01 said negative; that they had just started up route 1.37 north 
of Ban I.aboy when his wing man transmitted he was taking a hit. He was 
unable to raise him on frequency after that. We immediately turned north 
to head towards .his position. At this time we began receiving a strong 
beeE!'r• Enroute to the area we contacted Invert on guard for clearance 
into the PCA and notified them that the downed aircraft was probably in 
North Vietnam. Invert got radar contact with us and passed pidgeons to 
the area. Enroute to the area -we heard a call for 02 to come up voice. 
G t o e re ss a 
Ban La.Boy and began loo~ for the crash site. The wea r -was 
S/S coverage of strato-'.Oll:, bases at 3500 1 with tops at 7000 1 • This 
coverage -was interspersed with large holes which w:>uld form, laet for 
20 - JO minutes, and then close in again. We attempted to get down 
through some of these clear areas to locate the crash site. On our !irst 
ass we established voice contact with 02A. He said he was 11 0.K. I guese"• 
We were c ed once y nver a s · l.D1e and requested to fzy south as 
they were showing us 11too close to Waterloo". We were across the NVN 
border at this tim3. We requested Invert to contact Blue Chip and inform 
them or the survivor.a• pos· ion in NVN. A large hole tanned over the area, 
and at a roximate 1345 'We located the still burning aircraft wreakage. 
c ash 1'1te - - s on way 
t is a roximatel 
meters north of the Nam Carona river. -e a so o serve sever peop 
l rue in e diate vicinity. <A'1 the next pass 
we went over the crash site; 02A came up vo ce an said 'W passed right 
over him. We asked Invert to nark the position on radar, and Invert, again, 
tried to direct us to :fly south. For the third time, "1e asked Invert to 
contact Blue Chip and inform them of the situation. We also requested 
clearance to expend on the trucks moving toward the crash site and for 
additional ordnance to be directed to tre area. Misty 41 expended 2Qnm 
and several WP rockets on the road and suceeded in driVing the trucks and 
people under cover. On one pass we received approximately 30 to 40 rounds 
of 2J/37mm fire from a gun position along route 1.37 in the vicinity of 
delta 58. On another pass we received an undetermined number of rounds of 
ZPU. This osition was atl>ut 1 K. ncr th of delta 58. We again contacted 
02A and as e e a con ac wi 
h1lii but that Hfie shoUld have gotten out". 
radio and come up again in .30 minutes ....... wi_e _________________ _ 
----------· ··· - - ···· -·------ ·--·---------- ·- - ------ -- ···· ·------ ---·-·-- -- -
ve answer. We 
n e st place. 
At app t , eye ed e a er. 'N8.s on the 
scene holding south of delta 58, and Invert las trying to obtain fighters. 
The wather remained b&eically the same ldth a gradual improvement as the 
afternoon progressed. While K-41 was on the tanker, M-51 arrived on the 
scene and was hit b;y a 23/37rmn. They RTBed to Ubon. 1-f.isty 61 -was on the 
tanker when K-41. a?Tivad at the tanker, they remained ld.th M-41 and re-
turned to the SAR area lid.th us at 1445. We showed the crash site to them, 
described the looation of the survivor,, and marked the gun positions for 
them. This cycle was spent waiting on fighters,, the weather, and tr-Jing 
to get the SAR forces launched. Misty 61 went to the tanker early to get 
a cycle started so one Misty w::>uld be on the scene at ·all times. A 
"Gunfighter• fi:i8ht. arrived, however due to the load (high drag and napes) 
-we didn't want to put them on the 23/37m sites. Mistgr 4l went for a tanker 
_at approJd.mately 1545. Due to a mi.a-up by either Invert or Viking 1 Misty 61 
was sent to Cherey track and so was not back on target when M-41 cycled to 
the tanker. s ived back in the tar et area at about 1610. Misty 
61 was upending Cookie, Flight of 105's with CB - 1 on t e nm gun 
sites. Hi.sty 41 observed 75 to 100 rounds of 23/37mm. directed at M-61 and 
Cookie flight.. 1 with air bursts at 7000 ft. Additional flights were 
~ended b1 M-61 ld.th no growxi fire response. Misty 41 felt that the 
23/37mm was silenced and, furthennore, sufficiently far enough south not 
to be a !actor to the Sandys and the Jolly 1s anyway. We requested Crown 6 
to send in the Sandiea. The Sandies and the Jolly 1s were being held in 
Iaos a considerable . distance from the SAR area. Due to the fire received 
by M-41, M-51, am H-61, Crolm 6 would not allow them in the area until 
the gUl'l$ were sileo=ed. We felt that due to the distance from the guns 
to the SAR area they l0uldn 1t be a factor for t:te Sandy's. Obtaining fast 
mover fll8'lta !or AAA supp:-ession was sporadic. The first flight sent to 
us was loaded napes and high drags and we w:>uldn •t put them on the guns • 
Subsequent fii;hts all had CBU-24 1a and M-ll7's. There were numerous 
flights on tanker being controlled by' Invert. It appeared that Cro'Wl'l 6 
was having comnunication difficulties wl..th Invert and was unable to co-
ordinate effectively with them for a smooth, steady now of fighters. The 
Sandy's were fin&J.ly released to the area at approxi.n:Btely 1650,, however, 
the Jolly 1s, and Sandy's 9 and 10, were still held a considerable distance 
away. We led Sandy 1 and 2 to the crash site and descnbed the survivors 
location. Sandy 1 and 2 began an ADF search to pinpoint his position and 
fina.l..ly suceeded in locating him. Miscy 4l departed for the tanker at 
approximately' 1730' Misty; 61 111as re-enteri~ the area at this time. We 
briefed them the.t the Sani{y-•s wre in the area pinpointing the survivor 
and the Jolly-•s were holding. The weather in the immediate area waa clear 
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At appraximately 1330 hours on 25 Novanber, Misty 51, (Weidman/Kellum), 
was en-route to the tanker on Peach track to refuel when the Grommet 02 
SAR e:tfbrt was started. Being busy with the tanker, we were unable to · 
monitor the proceedings until dropping off the tanker. We then proceeded 
back to the foxtrot area to meet Lunar flight at 1420. As we proceeded 
to the area. we called Invert .f'or the particulars of the SAR effort and got 
the general location of the effort. We infonned them we were full of fuel 
and wre available for the SAR effort. Receiving no reply other then 
acknowledgment we proceeded to south of Tchepone to await Lunar flight. 
We monitored the SAR effort until about 1410 when w called Crown on guard 
and told them of our fuel state and availability tO participate in the 
effb rt. They said they would contact us if we were n~eded. At approximately 
1425 we called Invert and asked about Lunar flight. T'r.ey said they had not 
heard from them. About a minute later, Crown called us ani asked us to 
relieve Misty 41 who had to cycle to the tanker. We proceeded at once 
toward the delta 58 area. As soon as -we were on frequency we heard M-41 
\ 
go to the tanker. To "Wait so long to bring the next Misty into play in 
\ 
my oponion is a mistake. We h&tt tO proceed to the area with nothing but 
, a.- tacan/DME and iro---real description from M-41 of the grourxi situation or 
statua of the dololled pilots. Th6 only infornation le got was by simply 
monitoring the radio. Arriving in the general area, Crown contacted us 
and designated M-51 on scene coDIMnder. We picked up Nail 62, brought him 
over on frequency, ani found he was obbiting above the clouds over the 
crash sight. At this time, there was a solid overcast layer at about 6000' 
tha. t looked fairly thick. Due to our not knowing tM exact location of 
the downed ainnen, We told Nail 62 to orbit over the clouds and act as 
relay to all agencies and top caver for us. We elected to go about 8 miles 
south, drop under the clouds and try to establish contact with Groment 
02A and B. Finiing the bases of the blouds just above the mountain pea.ks, 
w entered at Ban Labdy just south of delta 58 and proceeded up Rt 137 to 
the coordinates trat we had copied doWl. We spotted the general area and 
made a sweeping pass over it and hear.one of the Granmets come up on radio 
and BBiY he heard us and we were close. Having very litUe room to turn we 
slid behind the mountains and elected to make another pass to narrow down 
Grommet 1s exact position. On the secooo pass -we told Granmet 'W9 would 
light the burner a:rxi to infonn us how we passed\ over him. Doing this, he 
informed us to come dolfl the slope at him and that we were very near. We 
again swung arourxi to make a pass to pinpoint his position. This time we 
passed exacUy over him and he told us we were receiving J?mm and heavy 
ZPU fire. Because of the very low clauds and our ability to talk to him 
only when very close, we f'lected to lllB.ke ~more pass to fix the guns 
positions relative to the pilots, and then pop up through t~e clouds. 
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Running just e&!lt of the road, we established voice contact with Grommet 
and immediately wre hit by a 37mm shell in the left aileron. We 
punched otf the stones and departed for NKP eventually laniing at Ubon. 
To make a few obs81"'1'8.tions, Mist;r 51 should have been brought into the 
effort in t1m to Jave been throughly briefed by Misty 41 and allowed to 
set up a f'uel-cycle overlap so as to always haveing a Misty in the area. 
This would allow a con&tant update of the situation as well as the ability 
to put fast movers in at any break in the -weather. 
~A/JI~ ;l~e-~ 
JAMES D. WEiill'iAN, L Lt, USAF RA.I.PH C. DELLUM, Capt, USAF 
Commando Sabre Pilot Comnando Sabre Pilot 
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